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Abstract
Beck,  Demirgiuc-Kunt, and Maksimovtc  investigate how a  functions of the banking system or to compensate  for the
country's financial  institutions and the quality  of its legal  general  inefficiency of the legal  system. But they do find
system explain the size attained by  its largest industrial  evidence that externally financed  firms are smaller in
firms  in a sample of 44 countries.  Firm size is positively  countries that have  strong creditor rights and efficient
related to the size of the banking system and the  legal  systems. This suggests that firms in countries with
efficiency of the legal system. Thus, the authors  find no  weak creditor protections are  larger in order to
evidence  that firms are larger  in  order to internalize  the  internalize  the protection  of capital investment.
This paper-a product of Finance, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the
determinants of firm size.  Copies of the paper are available  free from the World  Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,
DC  20433.  Please  contact  Kari  Labrie,  roomMC3-456,  telephone  202-473-1001,  fax  202-522-1155,  email  address
klabrie@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The
authors may be contacted  at tbeck@worldbank.org  or ademirguckunt@worldbank.org.  March  2003.  (46 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An obhective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations  are less than fully polished. The
papers cariy the names of the authors  and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper  are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
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Maryland.1. Introduction
A rapidly growing literature, originating with LLSV (1998), has demonstrated the importance of
the legal system and financial institutions for firms'  financial decisions, such as capital structure
and dividend policy.'  For the most part, this literature treats the firm size as given. However,
financial  intermediaries and the legal system provide an alternative way of accomplishing some
of the key functions that the firm accomplishes internally: the mobilization of resources for
investment,  the monitoring of performance,  and resolution of conflicts of interest among
different parties. As a result, the equilibrium size of firms might also depend on the development
of these institutions in each country. In this paper, we investigate empirically the relation of firm
size and the development of financial institutions and legal protection of investors in different
countries.
The corporate finance literature suggests that the financial and legal institutions could affect
firm size in opposing ways. First, several papers suggest that in countries with less developed
legal systems and financial  systems firm  growth is constrained by their ability to obtain external
finance (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and Rajan and Zingales (1998)). Beck,
Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (2002) find that small firms in countries with weak financial
systems report facing more obstacles to growth than large firms. In such countries large firms'
internal capital markets are likely to be more effective at allocating capital and monitoring
individual  investment projects than the public markets and financial institutions. As a result,
firms in countries with weak legal and institutional systems have an incentive to substitute
internal capital markets for public markets. This substitution suggests an inverse relation
between firm size and the development of a country's legal system and financial institutions.
'See  LLSV (2000) and Harvey and Rouwenhurst (2002) for an overview of this literature.
3However, there may also be an opposing effect at work. Large firms are also subject to
agency problems. Their size and complexity makes expropriation by firms' insiders difficult to
monitor and control by outside investors.  Thus, investors in large firms may require strong
financial institutions and effective legal systems to control expropriation by corporate insiders.
As a result, the optimal size of firms may be positively related to the quality of a country's legal
system and financial institutions.
We investigate empirically the relation between firm size and the development of
fiancial institutions and legal protection of investors in 44 countries.  We find that there exists a
positive relation between the level of development of a country's banking system and firm size.
This relation remains strong even after controlling for the size of the economy and national
income per capita. There also exists a somewhat weaker relation between firm size and the
capitalization  of the stock market. These results are stronger for firms that depend on external
finance. Moreover,  firms in countries with concentrated banking systems, which provide
incentives for bank monitoring and long term relationships  with borrowers, are also larger.
We also find significant relations between a country's legal system and firm  size. Large
firmns are larger in countries with more efficient legal systems. This effect is strongest for firms
that rely on extemal financing. However,  when we consider specific legal rights of creditors we
do find evidence of a negative relation between firm size and creditors'  rights.  This effect is
strongest when the legal system is efficient and for firms that depend on external financing.
Thus, we do find evidence that weak creditor protections, holding all other factors constant,
create incentives for increasing firm size in order to internalize the allocation of capital.
We also test for firm characteristics  and country characteristics other than the legal and
financial  system as determinants of firm size.  We find that firm size is positively related to the
4ratio of the firm's fixed assets to total assets, suggesting that there are economies of scale in
operating capital-intensive  businesses. By contrast, firm profitability and sales turnover do not
predict firm size. The largest firms tend to be larger in countries with high per capita incomes,
but the firm size is not related to human capital, as measured by secondary school enrollment in
the country.  Interestingly, the openness of an economy to foreign trade and competition is not
related to firm size once the other explanatory variables are held constant.
Our paper is related to the newly emerging literature on the role of financial and legal
institutions on firm performance.  LLSV (1997,  1998), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998),
and Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that developed financial  systems and the efficient
enforcement of laws facilitate external funding of firms. These papers take the distribution of
firm sizes as exogenous.  By contrast, we allow for the possibility that firn  organization may
adjust in response to the level of development of institutions and show that firm size and both the
development of the banking sector and the general enforcement of laws are complements.
Our paper is also related to two recent papers by Kumar,  Rajan and Zingales (2001)  and
Cetorelli (2002).  While Kumar,  Rajan and Zingales  also examine the determinants of firm size
across countries, their approach statistically infers firm sizes in different countries from
aggregate industry data in each country they consider.  By contrast, we obtain our data from
financial reports, and also focus on legal determinants of firm size. Cetorelli (2002) uses
industry-level data for 17 OECD countries to assess the effect of bank concentration  on industrial
concentration.  He, however, uses the average firm size for an industry rather than firm-level
data, as we do.
5The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the
hypotheses that we test. Section 3 discusses the data and our empirical methodology. Section 4
presents our main results. Section 5 concludes. Data sources are discussed in the Appendix.
2. Motivationi
The key question in analyzing firm size was posed by Coase (1937): "Why does the
boundary of the firm and the market fall where it does?" Coase argued that certain productive
tasks are optimally done within firms, where actions of subordinate managers  can be optimally
monitored, but that with increasing  size firms become inefficient. As a firm grows, there comes a
point where it reaches equilibrium size where the benefits of size are balanced by the costs. The
equilibrium size for each firm depends on its organizational capital, or in the case of
entrepreneurial firms, on the abilities of the entrepreneur (Lucas (1978), Maksimovic and
Phillips (2002)). However,  little is known about how the functioning of financial institutions and
legal systems in a country affects this balance and how the equilibrium firm size varies across
countries. We next examine how such an impact could arise.
a  Internal  Monitoring, Access to Capital  andFirm  Size
There are at least two ways that state of a country's financial and legal institutions can
determine whether it is more efficient to organize  an activity as a small stand-alone firm, or as a
unit of larger firm.2 At the project level, depending on the state of country's financial and legal
institutions, it may be more efficient to monitor projects internally in a firm rather than using the
2 See Stein (1997, 2002) for an analysis of the role of information flows in the organization of firms.
6capital market. At the firm level, access to capital markets may also depend on the size of the
firm.
A firm's internal  capital allocation process in certain respects functions more efficiently than
a public capital market. Firms are hierarchies,  and senior managers can command managers in
charge of a project to produce information, and provide finely calibrated incentive schemes. In
the event it becomes necessary, the firm's senior management can seize direct control of a non-
performing unit and liquidate its assets. These advantages of internal allocation of resources are
particularly valuable in economies  without effective external monitoring by financial
intermediaries or a legal system that can safeguard creditors' claims on assets.3
As shown by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic  (1998), firms in countries with less efficient
legal and financial  systems have less access to external financing. It is likely that the advantages
to having an internal capital market would be the highest in those countries.  Large firms have the
advantage of a large internal capital market.  Whereas a small firm that produces a limited range
of products might have to access public capital markets repeatedly in order to finance new
projects, a large firm may be able to self-finance by shifting capital from mature projects to
projects that are at the investment stage. Thus, the firm can avoid adverse selection costs that
arise when finns obtain capital from outside investors who are less informed than the firm's
managers  about the value of the firm's assets.
Empirical evidence in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) shows that small firms
in countries with weak financial and legal systems face significant obstacles to growth as a result
of poor relationships  with banks, in some cases due to perceived corruption of bank officials,  and
poor legal protections.  Large firms face less significant obstacles. This evidence suggests that in
3As Fluck (1999) points out, some projects that may be subject to the agency costs if financed  on a stand-
alone basis, particularly when renegotiation is costly, become viable as part of  a larger corporation.
7countries with weak financial and legal systems large firms have a comparative  advantage in
financing and monitoring individual investment projects. If this conjecture is valid and the effect
material, we would expect that, holding other variables constant, the equilibrium  firm size is
smaller in countries with efficient legal systems and  well-developedfinancial  systems.
However,  advantages to size might be offset if insiders of large firms can expropriate more
investor wealth in countries with weak institutions. In this case, the low quality of external
monitoring or the inability of external investors to prevent misappropriation acts as a cost to size.
A firm in a country with significant agency costs of size may mitigate those costs by, for
examnple, remaining under family control, perhaps at the cost of reduced operational
effectiveness.  As a result, the negative relation between the equilibrium size and the quality of a
country's institutions will not hold if large firm' insiders have a sufficiently large comparative
advantage in expropriating  assets in countries with weak financial and legal systems.
There is little empirical evidence on how the ability of managers to expropriate wealth varies
with the quality of a country's institutions and the ability to allocate resources using a firms'
internal capital market. However,  evidence on a related question, whether in a single country
firms which are organized  so that managers have discretion to shift funds across divisions are
subject to greater agency costs than single-division firms, suggests that there might exist a
similar relation between weak external monitoring that permits managerial discretion and value
dissipation. Studies using U.S. data by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) show
that when managers can allocate funds across industries in multi-divisional firms, the value of
the firms declines relative to a single-segment firm benchmark.  Comment and Jarrell (1995)
8document that stock market returns to conglomerate  firms are lower than that to single-segment
firms.4
The foregoing discussion suggests that if external monitoring is  more important in  reducing
dissipation in larger firms, then holding other variables constant, the equilibriumfirm  size is
larger  in countries with efficient legal systems and well-developedfinancial  systems. Below we
examine this conjecture empirically.
b. The Structure of  the Banking System and Firm Size
We expect that the equilibrium firm size is smaller if the banking system in their country is
configured in ways that minimize the informational differences  between small firms' insiders
and their banks.  As shown by Petersen and Rajan (1995), banks with market power have greater
incentives to establish lending relationships with smaller firms since they can recoup the costs of
acquiring information about the firms over the long term.5 As a result, we expect that equilibrium
firm size is smaller in countries with concentrated banking systems.  On the other hand, banks in
concentrated banking systems may have very close relationship with large incumbent firms, so
that we might find a positive relation between firm size and bank concentration.6 Below we test
whether, holding other variables constant, the equilibriumfirm size is smaller or larger  in
countries with concentrated  banking  systems.
4Berger and Ofek (1995)  and Comment and Jarrell (1995)  explain their findings by appealing to agency
theories that predict a misallocation of capital as firms allocate capital to segments that are under-
performing.  Rajan,  Servaes,  and Zingales (2000). Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) provide evidence that
investment allocations of conglomerates  across divisions in the U.S. are broadly consistent  with optimal
resource allocation, suggesting that the value dissipation  is not due to misallocation across projects, but
might occur at either at the headquarters  level or at peripheral segments with lower productivity.
5 Marquez (2000), and Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) also argue that bank screening of customers is more
intense  in concentrated banking markets.  Dinc (2000) argues that while the amount of screening initially
increases with concentration of the banking market, beyond a certain level concentration  may decrease the
amount of screening.  Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic  (2003) find that concentrated  banking
systems are associated with higher financing obstacles and lower probability of access to bank finance  for
firms.
9We also examine whether state control of banks affects optimal firm size. State control of
banks is a potentially important factor because, as shown by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes  and
Shleifer (2001), such banks are in general less efficient in allocating resources to productive uses
than private banks.  If state-controlled  banks act less efficient than private banks, we would
expect state control of a country's banking system to have the same impact on firm size as a
reduction in the size of the banking sector.  We test this conjecture below.
c. Investor Protections  and  Firm Size
In addition to examining the relation between the efficiency of the legal system and firm size,
we also examine the relation between specific investor protections and firm size. We expect that
investors have more incentives to be, and are more efficient as, monitors of loans in countries
that effectively protect investors' rights. Hence, we would expect less reliance on internal capital
markets in these countries.  However, strong investors' protections might also permit banks to
lend to large firms that would otherwise be subject to agency costs. Finally, the Critical Resource
Theory (Grossmann and Hart,  1986) predicts that the quantity of assets over which ownership
can be exerted, determines firm size.  This would also point to the efficiency of the legal system
as positively influencing firm size across countries.  Which of these effects predominates is an
empirical  question, and we test whether, holding other variables constant, the equilibriumfirm
size is smaller or larger  in countries that effectively protect investors' rights.
d.  Technology, the Market and  Firm  Size
Optimal firm size also depends on the firm's technology and on its market opportunities
(You,  1995). We control  for several of the factors identified in the literature.  We expect capital
intensity to be positively related to size. Firms in large markets and open economies may be able
6Lamoreaux (1991) shows that in  19dh  century New England "kinship networks"  regulated lending flows to
entrepreneurs, while Haber (1991) finds a similar pattern for the Mexican banking system of the late  19dh
10to take advantage of economies of scale not available in small markets and economies that have
been less affected by globalization.
In our analysis we also control for indicators of a country' s economic development,
specifically its Gross Domestic Product per capita and the educational level of its population.
These control variables reduce the risk that the institutional  and legal variables  we use are
proxying for other factors that depend on a country's level of development.  Richer economies
should have larger firms, since potential  entrepreneurs  face higher opportunity costs in the form
of higher wages (Lucas,  1978). A higher level of human capital in an economy might either
enable larger firms, due to higher managerial skills, or more and thus smaller firms, due to more
wide-spread entrepreneurial  skills (Lucas,  1978; Rosen,  1982 and Kremer,  1993).
We also include each firm's return on assets in our equations explaining firm size. A
persistent and systematic relation between firm size and return on assets might indicate that the
distribution of firm sizes in our sample is in disequilibrium, with a systematic mismatch between
benefits and costs of size. In addition,  in some of the tests below we focus on firms with an
external financing need. If, as we conjecture,  firm size depends on the development of financial
institutions, the size of firms that depend most on external financing is likely to be more sensitive
to differences  in institutions across countries.
e. Data  on Firm Size
Consistent data on the complete distribution of firm sizes across a representative sample of
developed and developing  countries is not available.  In their study, Kumar, Rajan and Zingales
(2001) infer representative firm sizes in each country from industry-level  data. This approach is
contingent on their ability to model the distribution of firm sizes in each country. Cetorelli
(2002) uses the average firm size on the industry level. By contrast, we use firm-level data
century.directly. Firm-level data is only available for the largest firms in each country. In common with
most of the literature, due to data limitations we focus on the largest firns in each country.7. The
tradeoffs between the advantages and disadvantages of size outlined above pertain to all firms in
an economy,  and specifically to the subsample of largest firms. However, in interpreting our
results it is important to bear in mind that these tradeoffs may not be as relevant for very small
firms, many of whom may not have access to external financing of from financial intermediaries.
Below we use fimn-level data for 44 countries to answer the following questions:
o  Are the largest firms in countries with the well-developed financial  systems bigger or
smaller than the largest firms in countries with less developed financial systems?
o  Is there a positive or negative relation between firm size and the efficiency of the
legal system?
o  Are strong shareholder and creditor protections positively or negatively related to
firm size?
o  Is a concentrated banking system associated with the existence of larger or smaller
firms?
o  Is state control of the banking system associated with the existence of larger or
smaller firms?
7  See, for example, LLSV (1999) on ownership concentration or Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic  (1998,
1999) on capital structure.
123. Data and Methodology
3.1. Data
We have annual data, for the period 1988-97, available for 44 countries, both developing
and developed.  To make the sample of firms comparable  across countries, we focus on the top
100 manufacturing companies,  where available.8 This section describes the data and its sources,
discusses descriptive  statistics and explains the methodology that we employ.9 Table  I lists the
economic and institutional indicators for the 44 countries in our sample, averaged over the
sample period  1988-97.  Table 2 provides descriptive statistics and correlations of all variables.
The firm-level data are drawn from financial  statements by large publicly traded
companies, collected by Worldscope.  We use total assets of a firm, relative to GDIP or in
constant U.S. dollars as dependent variable, and several other firm-specific  characteristics  as
potential determinants of firms size.
We use the share of a firm's total assets in its country's  GDP as our main indicator of
firm size.  This indicates the firm's size relative to the total output of an economy. This indicator
directly measures the proportion of a country's output produced within the firm, and can thus be
related to the institutional differences across countries.  In our sensitivity analysis we also use a
firm's total assets in constant U.S. dollars as indicator of firm size.  While not relating a firm size
to its country's economy, this indicator makes firm size directly comparable  across countries.  As
can be seen in Table 2, there is a wide variation in firm size, both as measured  by Assets/GDP
and by Assets in U.S. dollars.  Both measures are positively and significantly  correlated.
We use three firm-specific  characteristics as explanatory variables.  We use the Net Fixed
Assets divided by total assets to explore whether the structure of a firm's assets can explain its
8 See Appendix Table  I for number of firms in each countries and number of observations.
13size. A firm with a larger share of fixed assets in total assets has more collateral, thus larger
borrowing power and should therefore be better able to expand its operation using external
finance.  A larger share of fixed assets might also indicate a larger capital intensity, which is
predicted to result in larger firms (Lucas,  1978). We use the Net Sales to Fixed Assets to control
for different financing patterns across firms.  Specifically,  firms with higher net sales relative to
fixed assets might need more short-term financing to support sales. Finally, we use the Return on
Assets to explore whether more profitable firms are also larger.  The correlation matrix in Table
2 indicates that firms with a higher share of fixed assets are larger in terms of assets in GDP but
smaller in terms of U.S. dollars; they are thus smaller in absolute terms, but have a larger market
share, compared with firms with less fixed assets.
We use a broad array of economic,  social and institutional country-level indicators to
assess different theories of firms size. The first group comprises variables that proxy for
macroeconomic  determinants of firm size.  All these variables are available  on a yearly basis and
come from the World Development Indicators (WDI). The level of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) measures the overall size of the economy, while GDP per capita indicates the income
level of countries; both are measured in constant U.S. dollars.  As indicated by the data in
Tables 1 and 2, there is a wide variation in the income level, ranging from Pakistan (with an
average of $  1,563 over the period 1988-97) to the U.S. ($ 25,854).  We use the inflation rate to
indicate macroeconomic  volatility and uncertainty.  Again, there is a wide variation in monetary
stability across countries, ranging from an average  inflation rate of 1,020 percent in Brazil to less
than one percent in Japan.  The trade share in GDP - the sum of real exports  and imports in real
GDP - indicates the degree of openness of economies, while the gross secondary enrolment rate
proxies for the level of education in the economy.  Our sample includes both very open
9 For a detailed description of the data and its sources, see Appendix.
14economies (notably Singapore and Hong Kong with trade being more than three and two times
GDP, respectively)  and relatively closed economies (Argentina and Brazil with trade being less
than  18% of GDP). The gross secondary enrolment varies from 128%  in the Netherlands to 22%
in Pakistan.'0
We use two main indicators of financial sector development.  We use BANK CREDIT,
the claims of deposit money banks on the private sector as share of GDP to indicate the level of
financial intermediary development and MARKET CAPITALIZATION,  the value of
outstanding shares as share of GDP to measure the level of stock market development.  Recent
research has shown the importance of both financial intermediary  and stock market development
for economic development.'"  Access to financial  services varies substantially across the
countries in our sample.  BANK CREDIT constitutes only 8% of GDP in Peru, while it
constitutes  162% in Switzerland. Similarly, MARKET CAPITALIZATION  is only 3% in
Poland, while it is 161% in South Africa.  In our sensitivity analysis we employ several
additional financial sector indicators that measure specific aspects of financial sector
development.  CONCENTRATION  is the share of the assets of the three largest banks in total
banking sector assets to indicate the degree of bank concentration.  Finally PUBLIC BANKS, the
percentage of assets of the  10 largest banks owned by the government -as share of total assts of
these banks- measures the degree to which commercial banks are owned by the government.
Previous research has shown that economies with larger shares of government -owned banks
'° Gross secondary enrollment ratio is  the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of  age, to the population of
the age group that officially corresponds to secondary education. Adult education programs can therefore
result in enrolment rates above  100%.
1  1  We prefer BANK CREDIT to PRIVATE  CREDIT, as used by Levine,  Loayza and Beck (2000) and
Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000), since the latter also includes claims on the private sector by nonblank
financial intermediaries.  These, however,  might be in the form of equity holdings, thus be included in
MARKET CAPITALIZATION.  To avoid double counting, we therefore prefer the more narrow measure
of BANK CREDIT.
15have lower levels of financial development and experience  less economic growth.12 All
indicators of financial development  come from the financial structure database of the World
Bank (Beck,  Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine, 2000), with exception of Public, which was collected
by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2001).
We use several indicators of the legal environment to explore whether the legal system of
a country has an impact on the size of its firms.  Resent research has shown the importance of the
rights of outside investors, the efficiency of the legal system in enforcing contracts and the origin
of the legal system for financial sector development,  firm-growth and economic growth.'3
LAW&ORDER is an indicator of the degree to which the citizens of a country are able to use the
legal system to mediate conflict and enforce contracts.  This index, obtained from the
International  Country Risk Guide (ICRG), is scored between one and six, with higher values
indicating a more efficient legal system.  Our sample includes countries with a very high level of
contract enforcement  (among them Australia, Canada, New Zealand, U.S. and several West
European countries) and countries with weak legal enforcement ( Colombia and Peru).
CREDITOR-RIGHTS  measures the rights of secured creditors in the case of bankruptcy or
reorganization.  While CREDITOR-RIGHTS  indicates the rights of outside investors as detailed
in the laws on the books, LAW&ORDER  indicates the efficiency with which these rights and
contracts  in general are enforced.'4
12 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer (2001) and Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001).
13 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer, and Vishny (1997,  1998) and Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000)
show the importance of the protection of outside investors for financial development.  Demirgilc-Kunt and
Maksimovic  (1998)  find that firms access more long-term  financing in countries with more efficient legal
systems.  Finally, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer,  and Vishny (1997,  1998) and Beck,  Demirgilq-Kunt
and Levine (2003) show that distinguishing countries by the origin of their legal system can explain
variance in fnancial development  across these countries.
14 We also used an indicator of the legal origin of a country,  whether the legal system is based on the
Common law or French, German or Scandinavian Civil law system.  However,  once we controled  for the
creditor rights and laworder, the origin variable did not develop a significant  coefficient in our regressions.
16The correlations  shown in Table 2 show that firms are larger, as measured by their share
of assets in GDP, in countries with smaller GDP, but higher GDP per capita, with a higher trade
share, higher secondary enrolment rates, better developed banking sectors and stock markets,
more efficient legal system, but less creditor protection.  The correlations also reveal some
differences between the two measures of firm size - total assets in GDP and assets in constant
U.S. dollars.  Large firms, as measured in constant U.S. dollars, are larger in countries with a
larger GDP, less inflation, and a smaller trade share.  These differences can be explained by the
fact that Assets in GDP measures the size of the firm relative to its economy, while Assets in
constant U.S. dollars measures firm size in absolute terms.
3.2. Methodology
We employ two methodologies to explore the determinants of firms'  size.  Specifically,  we use
(i) a panel of annual firm-level data, controlling for both firm- and time-specific random effects,
and (ii) a cross-section of firm-level  data, with data averaged over the sample period and
including industry dummies.  Our panel regressions  take the following form:
SIZE,,IJ  = /A3FIRM,, + 8 2MACROJ,, +  833  FJNANCEJ,, +  34 LEGAL,,  + v, + r,+  (1)
where SIZE is measured either by total assets in GDP or total assets in constant U.S. dollars,
FIRM is a set of firm characteristics,  MACRO is an array of macro-economic variables,
FINANCE is a vector of indicators of financial development, LEGAL a set of variables
measuring the efficiency of the legal system, v the firm-, X the time-specific effect,  E the white-
noise error term and i, j  and t indicate firm, country and time period, respectively.
17We will run three regressions, including only one of the three vectors MACRO,
FINANCE,  and LEGAL at a time, and one regression estimating the complete model.  We use
random-effects as opposed to fixed-effects,  since this allows us to include time-invariant
variables, such as creditor rights.  The random-effects  model is also not as much subject to the
effects of measurement errors in the explanatory variables as the fixed-effects model (Moulton,
1987).
As noted above, the legal variables show little if  any time-series variation over the
sample period.  Even the variables  in the FINANCE and MACRO vectors show more cross-
country than over-time variance.  While the time-series variation in FINANCE and MACRO
vectors helps us distinguish the relation of each variable to firm size, there is a risk that using
panel techniques might add noise to our coefficient estimates and give the impression that we
have more independent observations than we actually have.  To guard against this risk we
therefore also estimate cross-section regressions where we average the data over the 1  0-year
sample period. Our cross-section regression takes the following form:
SIZEjj = 83,FIRM, +,8 21MCRO, + /3FINANCE,  +/4  LEGALj  +  k  +  ,  (2)
where 4 is an industry dummy variable for industry k.  We control  for 20 different industries.' 5
In interpreting estimates of the coefficients of equation (2), we recognize that by eliminating
time-series volatility we also increase the risk of not being able to distinguish the contribution of
each individual component of FINANCE and LEGAL due to multi-collinearity.
15  See Appendix Table A2 for the list of industries.
184. The Results
In Table III we examine the extent to which a country's legal system,  financial  system,
and macro-economic factors explain the sizes of its largest firms.  In Columns (1)  to (3),
we examine each of these factors separately,  and in Column (4) we include all of them in
a single regression.  In Panel A, all regressions are estimated using firm-level pooled data
over the  1988-1997 period using firm and year random effects. In Panel B, we adopt a
cross-sectional approach in which all variables are averaged over the sample period and
the regressions are estimated including industry dummy variables.
As Panel A of Table III shows, a country's legal system, financial system, and
macro-economic  factors predict the sizes of its largest firms.  There is a positive relation
between the size of the largest firms and the efficiency of a country's legal system, the
level of banking sector development,  GDP per capita and the inflation rate. There is a
negative relation between the size of the economy, measured by GDP and firm size. The
relation between size of the stock market and firm size is weaker: the coefficient of
MARKET CAPITALIZATION  is positive and significant when only the financial
variables are entered in Column (2), but loses significance when all the variables  are
entered in Column (4). By contrast, Education is significant in column (4), but not
significant in column (1), when only the Macro variables are entered. The openness of the
economy is not significant in any specification. The results in Panel B, where time-series
variation is eliminated are consistent in Columns (1)-(3) when the legal system, financial
system, and macro-economic  factors are entered in sequence,  and somewhat weaker in
Column (4), when all the factors are entered together.
19The positive relation of financial development,  legal efficiency and firm size, is
not only statistically significant, but also of economic significance.  One standard
deviation increase in BANK CREDIT is associated with an increase of 0.73*10-6 in firm
Assets/GDP, which constitutes one sixth of the average firm size in our sample.
Similarly, one standard deviation increase in LAW&ORDER  is associated with an
increase of 0.46* 10-6 in average firm size relative to GDP, one tenth of the average firm
size in our sample.
In our sample, there is also a positive relation between capital intensity (NFATA)
and firm size. However, we do not find a significant relation between return on assets and
firm size, or between the ratio of sales to net fixed assets and firm  size.
Taken together, the coefficients in Table III show that firm size and the
development of financial and legal institutions are complements, even when controlling
for the general level of income and development.  Thus, any advantage internal capital
markets might have in allocating resources in countries with weak financial  and legal
institutions is dominated by the inability of weak institutions to support and monitor large
firms.
In Table IV we investigate whether state ownership of banks and the
concentration of the banking sector affect firm size. We employ two specifications.  In
the first specification, we take Column (2) in Table III (where only financial variables are
entered) as our baseline model. We add CONCENTRATION  and PUBLIC BANKS to
the baseline model, one at a time (1-2) and all together (3). In the second specification we
take Column (4) in Table III where all the variables are entered together as our baseline
model. Again, we add CONCENTRATION and PUBLIC BANKS in the same way to
20this baseline.  In Panel A, all regressions are estimated using firm level pooled data over
the 1988-1997 period using firm and year random effects. In Panel B, all variables are
averaged over the sample period.
Table IV shows that a concentrated banking sector is associated with larger firms.
For firms in our sample, there is no evidence that a concentrated banking systems
provides  a comparative advantage to small size, contrary to the findings of Petersen and
Rajan (1995).  Instead, at least for the large firms we examine,  concentration of the
banking system is associated with larger firms, confirming the findings by Cetorelli
(2001). The role of public ownership of banks is more ambiguous. Its coefficient is not
always significant, but in those cases when it is, it tends to be negative.  Thus, state
control of the banking system has an effect on firm size similar to that of a reduction in
the development of the banking system.
We next examine more closely the effect of the legal system on firm size. Our
legal variable, LAW & ORDER, is an indicator of the degree to which citizens of a
country are able to utilize the country's legal system to mediate disputes and enforce
contracts.  Although Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) find that LAW &  ORDER
predicts firms' use of external  finance, the measure does not differentiate between legal
systems that provide, at least formally, extensive investor protection and those that do
not. To address this issue we introduce an index of Creditor Rights, as compiled by
LLSV(1998).
In Table V we examine the relation between firm size and the existence of
Creditor Rights and effectiveness  of the country's legal system. In the regressions
reported in Table V we also interact CREDITOR RIGHTS variable with LAW &
21ORDER.  The interacted variable is thus increasing both on the existence of specific
protections, and in the ability of the country's citizens to use the protections that they
have been granted.
Table V, Panel A presents the panel results.  The coefficients of the interaction
between Creditor Rights are consistently negative yet significant only in one
specification.  In the cross-sectional estimates in Panel B, the coefficients are also
negative but not significant. Thus, we find weak evidence that firms in countries with
strong creditor rights and efficient legal systems are smaller. By contrast, the overall
efficiency of the legal system is positively related to firm size as before.
The negative coefficient for creditor rights variable suggests that a high degree of
creditor protection may create a comparative advantage  for small firms, most likely by
making it easier for small firms to obtain external financing. We investigate that
possibility next.
To investigate fuirther the relation between firm size, creditor rights and extemal
financing we split the sample into firms that are financing their investment intemally and
firms that are relying at least partially on external finance. We follow Deniirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1998) in using the standard "percentage of sales"  financial planning model
of Higgins (1974) to estimate the growth rates that the firms in our sample can attain
using internal  finance.16 For each firm the growth rate is derived from the financial
planning model under the assumption that the firm is self-financing and pays no dividend,
16 The financial planning model makes several implicit assumptions about the relation between the firm's
growth rate and its external financing need. First, the ratio of  assets used in production to sales is assumed
to be constant.  Second, the firm's profit rate per unit of sales is constant.  This assumption was examined in
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic  (1998). The results in that paper were not sensitive to different
assumptions about the rate of  return on marginal sales. Third, we assume that the economic depreciation of
existing assets equals that reported in  the financial statements.
22and is given by for time t by ROA/(1- ROAd,  where ROA, is the firm's return on assets.
For each firn  in each year we define a variable EXFIN, which is the excess firm growth
given by the difference between their growth and our estimate of the maximum rate
attainable  if the firm is entirely self-financing.  Thus, EXFIN is an indicator of
dependence of external financing.
In Table VI, we interact LAW &ORDER and CREDITOR RIGHTS and our two
financial variables BANK CREDIT and MARKET CAPITALIZATION  with EXFIN and
include the interacted variables to our specification. As before, an efficient legal system
is positively related to firm size and creditor rights are negatively related to firm size.
However, these relations are stronger for externally financed firms. The estimates show
that as creditor protections improve, the mean size of firms that obtain external financing
declines both absolutely and relative to firms that do not obtain external financing. The
pattern of size declines suggests that large firms lose comparative advantage in obtaining
external financing.
We next check whether our results are sensitive to our definition of firm size. By
normalizing the firm's assets by its country's GDP, our definition of firm size provides a
rough measure of the extent to which the country's economic activity is controlled by the
firm. This empirical definition thus captures the extent to which activities within the
country are controlled within the boundaries of the firms in our sample. An implication of
this definition is that a large firm in a small poor country might produce the same cash
flows as a small firm in a large rich country.
To explore the implications of our normalization,  Table VII replicates Table III,
using the U.S. dollar value of the firm's total assets as our measure of size. The
23coefficient estimates are consistent with the earlier reported results. Firms are larger in
high-income countries with large banking systems, efficient legal systems. Fixed assets
are associated with large firms. Large economies have larger firms,  as measured in U.S.
dollars, while we found them to have smaller firms relative to GDP (Table III).
S. Conclusion
In this paper we examine the relation between the development of a country's
financial and legal institutions and the size of the largest private firms in the country.
Both firms'  internal capital markets and a country's financial  institutions perform similar
tasks in finding and monitoring investment projects. Thus, we expect that in countries
with underdeveloped institutions, firms' internal capital markets substitute for external
providers of capital. If this effect is significant, then we expect to observe that firms are
larger in such countries.
However, large firms concentrate financial power in the hands of corporate
insiders who have an incentive to misappropriate the firm's assets. A sophisticated
financial sector and an efficient legal system might be necessary to control such
misappropriation.  Hence, large firms and strong institutions might be complements.
We find empirically that firmns are larger in countries with more developed,
concentrated  banking sectors and efficient legal systems.  These relations are stronger for
firms that are externally financed. Firm size is not as strongly associated with a large
stock market. These effects persist when we control for a country's general level of
economic development and size. Firm size and the effectiveness of a county's institutions
are complements.  We do, however, find a negative relation between strong creditor rights
24and firm size particularly for externally financed  firms. Thus, strong creditor rights might
allow small firms to borrow directly from banks, reducing the role of large internal
capital markets.
Overall,  our results do not support the view that large firms with internal  markets
and hierarchies can  compensate  for the underdevelopment  of financial  and legal
institutions in a country. Rather,  well developed institutions are a pre-requisite  for the
development of large corporations.  This finding holds for both financial  and legal
institutions, with the exception that internal capital markets may substitute for the
absence of creditor protections.  However, it is likely that agency costs at the firm level
dissipate the advantages of internalizing the allocation of capital in countries with
underdeveloped  institutions. 17
A limitation of our analysis  is that it focuses  on large firms. While the tradeoffs
we examine are likely to be most relevant to large firms, our findings do not address the
relation between financial institutions and the size distribution of small firms.
7 As recent financial scandals  in U.S. indicate, the issue of control of agency costs of large firns is also
important  in countries at the highest levels of institutional development.
25RERENCES
Ball, R., Kothari,  S.P. and Robin, A., 2000. The effect of international institutional
factors on properties of accounting earnings. Journal  ofAccounting and
Economics 29,  1-5 1.
Barth, J.R.; Caprio,  G. Jr.; Levine, R., 2001,  "The Regulation and Supervision of Banks
around the World. A New Database. In: Litan, R.E.; Herring, R. (Eds.),
Integrating Emerging Market Countries into the Global Financial System.
Brookings Institution  Press, Washington, D.C.
Beck, Thorsten; Levine, Ross; Loayza, Norman, 2000, "Finance and the Sources of
Growth," Journal  of  Financial  Economics, 58(1).
Beck, Thorsten; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli; Levine, Ross, 2000, "A New database on the Structure
and Development of the Financial Sector" The World Bank Economic Review (14), 597-
605.
Beck, Thorsten; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli; Levine, Ross, 2003, "Law, Endowments, and
Finance", Journal of Financial Economics,  forthcoming.
Beck, Thorsten; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli; Maksimovic, Vojislav, 2002, Financial and Legal
Constraints to Firm Growth: Does Size Matter?,  World Bank Mimeo.
Beck, Thorsten; Demirguc-Kunt, Asli; Maksimovic, Vojislav, 2003, Bank Competition,
Financing Obstacles and Access to Credit, World Bank Mimeo.
Berger and Ofek, 1995,  Diversification's effect on firm value, Journal  of  Financial
Economics 37, 39-66
Carlin W. and Colin Mayer,  1999, Finance, Investment and Growth, Unpublished
Working Paper, University College, London.
Cetorelli and Peretto, 2000, Oligopoly banking and capital accumulation,  Working Paper,
Federal  Reserve Bank of Chicago
Coase, R. H, 1937, The Nature of the Firm, Economica 386-405.
Comment and Jarrell,  1995,  Corporate Focus and Stock Returns, Journal  of  Financial
Economics 37, 67-87
Demirguc9-Kunt,  Asli and Vojislav Maksimovic,  1998, Law, Finance, and Firm Growth,
Journal  of  Finance 53, 2107-2137.
DemirgGc-Kunt,  Asli and Vojislav Maksimovic,  1999, Institutions, Financial Markets
And Firm Debt Maturity, Journal  of  Financial  Economics.
26Demirgfi,-Kunt,  Asli and Vojislav Maksimovic,  2001, Firms as Financial
Intermediaries:  Evidence  from Trade Credit Data, World  Bank Working Paper.
Dinc, 2000, Bank Reputation, Bank Commitment and the Effects of Competition in
Credit Markets, Review of  Financial  Studies 13,  781-812
Fazzari,  Steven M., R. Glenn Hubbard, and Bruce C. Petersen,  1988, Financing
constraints  and corporate investment, Brookings Papers  on Economic Activity  19,
141-195.
Fluck, Z, 1999, "The Dynamics of the Management-Shareholder  Conflict", Review of
Financial  Studies, 12 (Summer), 379-404.
Fluck, Z. and A. Lynch, 1999, "Why Firms Merge and Then Divest: A Theory of
Financial Synergy",  The Journal  of  Business, 72 (July), 319-346.
Harvey and Rouwenhurst, 2002,  Emerging Markets Finance, Duke University Working
Paper.
Hung, Mingyi, 2001, Accounting  standards and value relevance of financial statements:
An international  analysis, Journal  ofAccounting and Economics 30, 401-420.
Johnson, Simon; Daniel Kaufinann, John McMillan,  and Christopher Woodruff, 2000,
"Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism," Journal  of
Public  Economics, 76, 495-520.
King, Robert G. and Levine, Ross,1993,  "Finance and Growth:  Schumpeter Might Be
Right", Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics, 108, 717-38.
Kumar, Rajan and Zingales, 2001,  What Determines Firm Size, NBER  Working Paper
#7208.
Lang and Stulz,  1994, Tobin's q Corporate Diversification  and Firm Performance,
Journal  of  Political  Economy 102(6),  1248-1280
La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes,  Florencio, and Shleifer, Andrei;  1999,  Corporate
Ownership Around the World, Journal  of  Finance  53.
La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes,  Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei; and Vishny, Robert W.
1998, Law and Finance, Journal  of  Political  Economy 106,  1113-1155.
La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes,  Florencio;  Shleifer, Andrei; and Vishny, Robert W.
1997, Legal Determinants of External Finance, Journal  of  Finance  52,  1131 -
1150.
27La Porta, Rafael; Lopez-de-Silanes,  Florencio; Shleifer, Andrei; 2002 Government
Ownership of Banks, Journal of  Finance 57(1).
Levine, Ross and Zervos,  Sara,  1998, "Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth,"
American Economic Review, 88(3), 537-558.
Love, Inessa, 2001, "Financial Development and Financing Constraints: International
Evidence from the Structural Investment Model," World Bank Working Paper,
No. 2694.
Lucas, Robert E.,1978, On the size and distribution of business firns, Bell Journal  of
Economics 9(2), 508-523.
Maksimovic  and Phillips, 2002, Do Conglomerate Firms Allocate Resources  Inefficiently
Across Industries? Theory and Evidence, Journal  of  Finance, 721-767.
Marquez, 2000, Corporate Reorganizations and Non-cash Auctions,  The Journal  of
Finance, 55(4), 1850-1854.
Mauro, Paul, 1996, "The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government
Expenditure," IMF Working Paper  96/98.
Modigliani, Franco and Enrico Perotti, 1998, Security versus bank finance: the
importance of a proper enforcement of legal rules,  Unpublished  MIT working
paper.
Moulton,  1987, Diagnostic for group effects in regression analysis, Journal  of  Business
and  Economic Statistics  5, 275-282.
Petersen and Rajan, 1995, The Effect of Credit Market Competition on Lending
Relationships, Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics 110(2), 407-443
Pistor, K., 1999. Law as a determinant of equity market development.  Unpublished
working paper, Harvard  University, Cambridge, MA.
Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales,  1998, Financial dependence  and growth,  American
Economic Review 88, 559-587.
Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales, L., 1999, The politics of financial development.
Unpublished  working paper, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL.
Rajan,  Servaes and Zingales, 2000, The Costs of Diversity: The diversification discount
and inefficient investment, Journal  of  Finance,  55(1), 35-80.
Schiffer, MiWjam and Beatrice Weder, 2001, Firm Size and the Business Environment:
Worldwide Survey Results, IFC  discussion  paper number 43.
28Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny,  1993, Corruption, Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics, 108 (3),
995-1025.
Stein,  1997, Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources,
Journal  of  Finance 52,  111-133.
Stein, 2002, Information Production and Capital Allocation:  Decentralized  versus
Hierarchical  Firms, Journal  of  Finance 57(5).
Stulz, Rene and Williamson, Rohan, 2001, Culture, Openness, and Finance,  University
of  Ohio mimeo.
Wurgler, J., 2000, Financial markets and the allocation of capital, Journal  of Financial
Economics 58, 187-214.








0.0002  __  __
Figure  q  I  1 
Figure 1. Assets/GDP  is given by total assets of the largest 100 firms in manufacturing divided by GDP.  The figure presents the average
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Figure 2.  Assets is given by total assets of the largest  100 firms in manufacturing in millions of US dollars..  The figure presents the average
assets for firms in each country for 1988-1997.  The countries are in descending  order.
31Table I
Economic and Institutional Indicators
GDP/CAP is the real GDP per capita in US$. INFLATION is the log difference of  the Consumer Price Index.  OPENNESS is
given  by imports plus exports  divided  by GDP  EDUCATION  is gross enrolment in  secondary  schools.  BANK CREDIT is
bank credit  extended  to the private  sector  divided  by GDP.  MARKET CAPITALIZATION  is stock  market capitalization
divided by GDP.  LAW & ORDER,  scored  I to 6,  is  an  indicator of the degree  to which citizens  of a country  are able  to
utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  Values are 1988-97 averages.
GDP/CAP  INFLATION  OPENNESS  EDUCATION  BANK  MARKET  LAW &
(US S)  CREDIT  CAPITALIZAT  ORDER
ION
Argentina  9972  5 67  17.78  72.11  0.15  0.09  3 9
Australia  19353  0.03  36.75  111.80  0.65  0.66  6
Austria  20737  0 03  77.49  104.29  0.91  0.12  6
Belgium  21255  0.03  137.08  123.99  0 51  0 36  5.9
Brazil  6182  1020  17.04  44.80  0.23  0.17  36
Canada  21677  0.02  61.82  102.53  0.54  0.57  6
Chile  6418  0 13  60.97  71  63  0.44  0.73  44
China  2064  0.10  36.96  56.98  0.85  0.08  4 1
Colombia  5340  0.25  34.48  55.58  0.15  011  1.4
Czech Republic  12016  0 16  106.42  92.51  0.56  0.27  5 8
Denmark  21538  0.03  66 45  113 00  0.40  0.33  6
Finland  18291  0.03  57 05  116.22  0.77  029  6
France  19431  0 02  43 31  103.79  0 88  0.32  5.5
Germany  21077  0.03  49 45  103.19  0.92  024  6
Greece  12397  0.13  44.74  94.16  018  013  4 6
Hong Kong  19646  0.08  273.24  79.15  1.42  1.79  4.9
Hungary  9319  0.23  69.99  84.58  0.36  0 04  5 3
India  1626  0 09  20 92  46.22  0.25  0 24  2.9
Indonesia  2434  0.09  50 70  47.22  0.42  0.15  3.5
Ireland  15141  0 03  124.61  108.29  0.29  0.26  5 2
Israel  15393  0.14  78.08  86.26  0.58  0.30  3.7
Italy  19058  0.05  42.27  87.36  0.52  0.17  5.2
Japan  21928  0 01  18.52  98.04  1.16  0.89  5.6
Korea  11306  007  61  10  9424  0.51  0.39  3.8
Malaysia  6191  0.04  161.36  58.46  0.72  1.75  4
Mexico  6964  0.31  44 01  56.61  0.19  0.27  3
Netherlands  19273  0.02  11040  127.51  088  0.65  6
New Zealand  15841  0.03  56 94  99.82  0 69  0.46  6
Norway  22655  003  71  56  110.41  0.58  0.24  6
Pakistan  1563  011  38.41  21.70  0.23  014  2.3
Peru  3965  10 69  30.28  68.01  0 08  0.11  2
Philippines  3463  0 09  72.39  75.65  0.26  0.44  2.5
Poland  6384  0.31  45.89  88.49  0 08  0.03  5
Portugal  12523  0 08  67 26  84  54  0 53  0.14  5.2
Singapore  15987  0.03  365.24  69.94  0.81  1.27  5.4
S.Africa  8435  0.13  44.14  80.49  0.58  1.61  2.6
Spain  14157  0.05  40.63  111.60  0.68  0.29  5.1
Sweden  19114  0.04  64.89  113.30  0 47  0.60  6
Switzerland  24801  0.03  69.78  99.76  1 62  0 94  6
Taiwan  14268  0.03  90 59  . 1.16  0.84  4.9
Thailand  4981  0.05  80.33  41.69  0.72  0.49  4 5
Turkey  5434  0.75  38.62  51.61  0 13  0 12  3.5
UK.  18178  0.05  52.54  11024  1.10  1.08  5.4
U S.  25854  0.03  21.67  95 94  0 66  0.75  6
32Table II
Summary Statistics and Correlations
Summary  statistics and correlations  are presented  in Panel A and B of the table, respectively.  N refers to firm  level observations  for 44
countries over the 1988-1997  period.  The variables are  defined as follows  ASSETS/GDP is given by total assets of the firm divided  by
GDP. Assets  ($) is  total firm assets in billions of US $.  NFATA is the net fixed assets divided  by total assets.  NSNFA is  the net sales
divided  by net  fixed  assets.  ROA  is  return  on assets.  GDP  is  given  in  billions of U.S.  dollars.  GDP/CAP  is  real  GDP per capita  in
thousands  of USS. INFLATION  is  the log  difference  of the Consumer  Price Indicator.  OPENNESS  is given  by imports  plus exports
divided by GDP. EDUCATION  is gross enrolment in secondary schools  BANK CREDIT is bank credit extended to the private sector
divided by GDP  MARKET CAPITALIZATION  is stock market capitalization divided  by GDP. LAW &  ORDER, scored  I to 6, is an
indicator  of the degree  to  which citizens  of a  country are  able  to utilize the  existing  legal  system to mediate  disputes  and enforce
contracts.  CREDITOR  RIGHTS,  scored  0  to  4,  is  an  index  aggregating  different  creditor  rights  Detailed  vanable  definitions  and
sources are given in  the appendix.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
N  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum
ASSETS/GDP  19912  4.65 x  106  1 18 x to-,  0.00000  0.00022
ASSETS($)  20185  0003  0010  0000  0275
NFATA  19724  0370  0.180  0000  1.000
NSNFA  19636  4 491  17 806  0.000  941.548
ROA  19250  0 042  0 207  -25.890  1.932
GDP ($)  29622  699  1350  12 4  8240
GDP/CAP  29564  14.374  7.636  1 293  30 013
INFLATION  29463  0 505  3.165  -0  015  68 370
OPENNESS  29599  74 282  68 977  13.244  406 750
EDUCATION  24845  86 534  28.137  18 900  152.700
BANK CREDIT  29097  0 670  0 365  0 016  1 676
MARKET CAPITALIZATION  28743  0 583  0.543  0 002  2 881
LAW &  ORDER  29095  4 841  1 363  1  6
CREDITOR RIGHTS  28540  2 255  1 258  0  4
33fPamell  D3:  Coirreladom MaMn  of VrDaiabReS
ASSETS/  ASSETS  NFATA  NSNFA  ROA  GDP  GDP/  INFL.  OPENNESS  EDUCATION  BANK  MARKET  LAW
GDP  S  CAP  CREDIT  CAPITALIZA  AND
TION  ORDER
ASSETS ($)  0.420
NFATA  0.05 a  -0.07a
NSNFA  -0.01  -0.01  -0.05a  1.00
ROA  0.00  -0.01 C  _0.0 2 b  -0.02  1.00
GDP  -0.05a  0.43a  -0.08'  -0.01  -0.01'
GDP/CAP  0.07 0  0.23'  -0.12'  0.01C  -0.04'  0.42a
INFL.  -0.01  -0.03'  0.10'  0.00  -0.01  -0.04'  -0.17'
OPENNESS  0.06'  -0.14a  0.01  0.01  0.02'  -0.27'  0.12'  -0.11O
EDUCAT.  0.07'  0.10'  -0.16'  0.03'  -0.06'  0.17'  0 80'  -0.22 a  -0.02D
BANK  0.08'  0.14'  -0.11,  0.00  -0.01  0.18'  0.53'  -0.20'  0.28'  0.35'
CREDIT
MARKET  0 05'  0.04'  0.05'  -0.01c  0.04'  0.05'  0.21'  -0.12'  0.55'  0.04'  0.51'
CAPITALIZ
ATION
LAW  ORD  0.05'  0.13'  -0.15'  0 0 1b  -0.03'  0.25'  0.77'  -0. 17  0.13'  0.68a  0.45'  0.14'
CREDITOR  -004'  -0.10,  0.03'  0.00  0.02'  -0.21'  -0.28'  -0.16'  0414  -0.27'  0.09'  0.32'  -0.20'
RIGHTS
N,b and'  stand for significance levels at 1, 5 and  10 percent,  respectively.
34Table IH
Determinants of Firm Size
The regression equation  estimated  is: SIZE = V + 3, NFATA + 32 NSNFA +33 ROA +3 4GDP + 35GDP/CAP +  36INFLATION  +  37
OPENNESS + 3s EDUCATION  + 39 BANK CREDIT + 3io MARKET CAPITALIZATION+  31,  LAW  &  ORDER +,.  Dependent
variable, SIZE,  is given by total assets of the firm divided by GDP. NFATA  is the net fixed  assets divided by total assets.  NSNFA is
the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROA is return on assets. GDP  is given in billions of U.S. dollars. GDP/CAP  is real GDP per
capita  in US$.  INFLATION  is  the  log difference  of the  Consumer Price  Indicator.  OPENNESS  is given  by  imports  plus exports
divided by GDP.  EDUCATION  is gross enrolment  in secondary schools.  BANK CREDIT is bank credit extended  to the private sector
divided by GDP.  MARKET  CAPITALIZATION  is stock market capitalization  divided by GDP. LAW &  ORDER,  scored  I  to 6, is
an indicator of the  degree to which citizens  of a country are able to utilize the existing legal  system to mediate disputes  and enforce
contracts.  Specifications (1-3) enter groups of variables separately.  Specification (4) is the full model.  In Panel A, all regressions are
estimated  using firm  level  pooled  data over the  1988-1997 period  using  firm  and year random  effects.  In Panel B,  all variables  are
averaged  over  the  sample  period  and  regressions  are  estimated  including  industry  dummy  variables.  Standard  errors  are  given  in
parentheses.  In  all  specifications  coefficients  are  multiplied  by  106.  Detailed  variable  definitions  and  sources  are  given  in  the
appendix.
Panel A: Panel Results
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
NFATA  3.2200***  3.0300***  2.9300***  3 2600***
(0  3860)  (0 3410)  (0.3530)  (0 3950)
NSNFA  0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0 0002
(0 0003)  (0 0002)  (0.0002)  (0.0003)
ROA  -0 9020*  -0.0576  -0 0677  -0.3140
(0 5290)  (0.1200)  (0.1250)  (0.5450)
Macro variables:
GDP ($)  -0.0006"'  -0.0006"'
(O  0001)  (0.0001)
GDP/CAP  0.0002***  0 000**
(0.0000)  (O 0000)
INFLATION  0 0006"'  0.0005"'
(0.0002)  (0.0002)
OPENNESS  0.0022  0 0017
(0.0024)  (0.0031)
EDUCATION  -0 0049  -0 0067**
(0.0031)  (0.0031)
Financial variables:
BANK CREDIT  1.9900*"*  2 0100"'
(0.2860)  (0.3660)
MARKET  0.3760"'  -0.0538
CAPITALIZATION  (0.1090)  (0.1380)
Legal variable:
LAW &  ORDER  0.3350"'*  0 2010"'*
(0.0417)  (0.0366)
R'  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.02
No. of firms  2746  2948  2943  2726
No. of Observations  15925  18314  18468  15252
*and  ***  indicate significance levels of 10,  5 and  I percent respectively.
35Panel B: Cross-Section  Results
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
NFATA  2.8600°°  1.7000  2.2500°  2.7200°4
(1.2800)  (I 2200)  (1.2300)  (1.2800)
NSNFA  -0.0004  -0.0002  -0.0003  -0.0003
(0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)  (0.0006)
ROA  0.3370  -0.1620  0.4790  0.0254
(2.3600)  (2.3000)  (2.2900)  (2.3600)
Macro variables:
GDP (S)  0.0008°°°  .0.0009°°o
(0 0002)  (0.0002)
GDPICAP  0.0001°°  -0.0001
(0.0001)  (0.0001)
INFLATION  -0.0005  -0.0016
(0.0010)  (0.0010)
OPENNESS  0.0010  -0.0041
(0.0033)  (0.0042)
EDUCATION  0.0283  0.0411°°
(0.0153)  (0.0163)
Financial  variables:
BANK CREDIT  2.5700°°°  2.1100°°°
(0.6450)  (0.8270)
MARKET  0.1910  0.7270
CAPITALIZATION  (0.4840)  (0.6490)
Legal variable:
LAW &  ORDER  0.8020°°°  -0.3600
(0  1660)  (0.3790)
0.06  0.05  0.05  0.07
No. of firms  2861  2961  2961  2861
No. of  Observations  2861  2961  2961  2861
0,  cc and  C4C indicate significance  levels of 10, 5 and I  percent respectively.
36Table IV
Determinants  of Firm Size - Additional Financial Variables
The regression  estimated  is SIZE  =  V  +  31  NFATA  + 32  NSNFA  +33  ROA  +3 4GDP  + 33GDP/CAP + 36INFLATION  + 37
OPENNESS  +  3s  EDUCATION  +  39  BANK  CREDIT  +  310  MARKET  CAPITALIZATION+  3,, LAW  & ORDER  +312
CONCENTRATION + 
31 PUBLIC  BANKS+  ,..  Specification  (a) corresponds  to specification  (2) in Table  11 where only financial
variables are entered.  To this baseline CONCENTRATION  and PUBLIC BANKS are added one at a time (1-2) and all together (3).
Specification (b)  confesponds to specification (4)  in  Table IlI and estimates the fill model, Again, the additional variables are added in
the same way to this baseline. CONCENTRATION  is the share of the assets of 3 largest banks  in total  banking assets.  It is calculated
from  individual  banking  data  by averaging  over  all  the banks  in  the country  and  are  available  for the  1990-97  period.  PUBLIC
BANKS  is percentage  of assets of the 10 largest banks  in each country owned  by the government as  a share of total assets of these
banks in  1995.  In Panel  A,  all regressions are estimated using firm level  pooled data over the  1988-1997 period  using firm and year
random effects.  In Panel B, all variables are averaged  over the sample period and regressions  are estimated  including industry dummy
variables.  Standard errors are given  in parentheses.  In all specifications coefficients are multiplied by  106. Detailed variable  definitions
and sources are given in the appendix.
Panel A: Panel Results
(1)  (4)  (5)
a  b  a  b  a  b
BANK CREDIT  2.5600*6*  2.4400***  2.0900*"*  2.2600*"*  2.5700*"*  2.5500"*'
(0.3090)  (0.3900)  (0 2930)  (0.3750)  (0 3200)  (0.4060)
MARKET  0.47700*6  -0 0709  0.3640*"*  0 0085  0.4540'*'  -0.0348
CAPITALIZATION  (0.1290)  (0  1760)  (0.1130)  (0.1430)  (0.1370)  (0.1850)
CONCENTRATION  1.6800*"*  1.3000"'  1.6700*6  1.2600"'
(0.2950)  (0.3530)  (0.3080)  (0.3660)
PUBLIC BANKS  -0.0160*"  -0.0088  -0.0157*"  -0.0115
(0 0071)  (0  0088)  (0.0073)  (0 0093)
0.02  0.02  0.0097  0.02  0.02  0.02
No of Firms  2903  2683  2729  2507  2686  2466
No. ofObservations  15285  12324  17094  14104  14211  11322
Panel B: Cross-Section  Results
(1)  (4)  (5)
a  b  a  b  a  b
BANK CREDIT  2.6000*"*  2.1000*6*  2.4300*6*  2.2300"*  2.5800**'  2.3700*"*
(0 6420)  (0.8260)  (0.6210)  (0.7930)  (0.6170)  (0.7960)
MARKET  0.1690  0.6760  -0.3240  0 8510  -0.8370  0.0065
CAPITALIZATION  (0.4820)  (0 6490)  (0 5120)  (0.7790)  (0 5160)  (0.8720)
CONCENTRATION  5.54000**  2.5100*  6.1500*"*  3.3100*"
(0.9960)  (1.4200)  (0.9980)  (1.6600)
PUBLIC BANKS  0 0191*6  0.0002  -0.0352**'  -0 0171
(0.0082)  (0 0012)  (0.0085)  (0.0147)
R'  0.0568  0.07  0.0464  0.07  0.06  0.06
No. of Finns  2961  2861  2737  2637  2737  2637
No. of Observations  2961  2861  2737  2637  2737  2637
6,  6*  and 6**  indicatc significance  levels of 10, 5 and I percent rcspectively.
37Table V
Determinants of Firm Size: Legal Efficiency and Creditor Rights
The regression equation estimated is:  SIZE = V + 3, NFATA +  32 NSNFA +33 ROA +3.GDP +  35GDP/CAP + 3 6INFLATION + 37
OPENNESS + 39 EDUCATION + 39 BANK CREDIT  +  3X0 MARKET  CAPITALIZATION+  31H  LAW & ORDER++  312 LAW &
ORDERxCREDITOR  RIGHTS+ 3, 3CREDITOR  RIGHTS +  ,. Dependent variable,  SIZE, is given by total assets of the firm divided
by GDP  NFATA is the net fixed assets divided by total assets.  NSNFA is the net sales divided by net fixed assets. ROA is return  on
assets. GDP is given in billions  of U.S. doltars. GDP/CAP  is real  GDP per capita in US$.  INFLATION  is the log difference of the
Consumer  Price  Indicator.  OPENNESS  is  given  by  imports  plus  exports  divided  by  GDP.  EDUCATION  is  gross  enrolment  in
secondary schools. BANK CREDIT is bank credit extended to the private  sector divided by GDP.  MARKET CAPITALIZATION  is
stock market capitalization  divided by  GDP.  LAW & ORDER, scored  I to 6,  is an indicator of the  degree to which  citizens  of a
country are able  to utilize the existing legal system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts.  CREDITOR  RIGHTS  is an index that
ranges from  0 to 4 and aggregates  creditor rights as described in the appendix.  In Panel  A,  all regressions  are estimated  using firm
level  pooled  data over the  1988-1997  period  using firm  and year  random effects.  In  Panel B,  all variables  are  averaged  over the
sample  period  and regressions  are estimated  including  industry  dummy  variables.  Standard efrors  are  given  in parentheses.  In al
specifications coefficients are multiplied by 10o.  Detailed variable definitions  and sources are given  in the appendix.
Panel A: Panel Results
(1)  (2)
NFATA  29500***  3.3100***
(0 3520)  (0.4000)
NSNFA  0.0002  -0.0002
(0.0003)  (0.0003)
ROA  -0.0625  -0 2520
(0.1250)  (0.5500)
Macro variables:








EDUCATION  -0 0060
(0.0032)
Financial variables:





LAW &  ORDER  0.5310***  0.3570**
(0.0103)  (0.0120)
LAW x CREDITOR  -0.0722**  -0.0334
RIGHTS  (0.0343)  (0.0255)
CREDITOR  -0.0736  -0.0334
RIGHTS  (0 0227)  (0.0255)
R
2 0.01  0.02
No. of firms  2800  2611
No  of Observations  18131  15013
**  and '**  indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and  I percent respectively.
38Panel B: Cross-Section Results
(1)  (3)
NFATA  23700**  2.6400'*
(1.2800)  (1.3400)
NSNFA  -0.0003  -0.0003
(0.0006)  (0.0006)
ROA  0.9380  -0.0108
(2.3600)  (2.4300)
Macro variables:
















LAW &  ORDER  0.7940***  0.2400
(0.3100)  (0.4660)
LAW x CREDITOR  -0.0375  -0.1800
RIGHTS  (0. 1190)  (0.1390)
CREDITOR  -0.0803  0.1220
RIGHTS  (0.5480)  (0.6510)
R
2 0.05  0.07
No. of firms  2818  2718
No  of Observations  2818  2718
,  and ***  indicate significance  levels of 10, 5 and  I percent respectively.
39Table VI
Sensitivity Tests: Determinants of Firm Size and Financing Constraints
The regression equation  estimated is.  SIZE = V + 3, NFATA +  32 NSNFA +33 ROA +3 4GDP + 3,GDP/CAP + 3dINFLATION + 3,
OPENNESS  + 3s EDUCATION  + 39 BANK + 310  BANK  CREDIT*EXFIN  + 31,  MARKET CAPITALIZATION+  312 MARKET
CAPITALIZATION*EXFIN  + 313  EXFIN+  3u4  LAW  & ORDER+  31,  LAW  & ORDER*EXFIN  + 316  CREDRIGHTS+  3,7
CRED RIGHTS'EXFIN+ ,.  Dependent  variable, SIZE,  is  given by total assets  of the firm  in US S.  NFATA  is the net fixed  assets
divided by total assets  NSNFA  is the net sales  divided by net fixed assets  ROA is return on assets. GDP is given in billions of U.S
dollars. GDP/CAP  is real GDP per capita  in US$. INFLATION  is the log difference of the Consumer  Price Indicator  OPENNESS  is
given by imports plus exports divided by GDP. EDUCATION  is gross enrolment in secondary schools.  BANK CREDIT is bank credit
extended to the private sector divided  by GDP  MARKET CAPITALIZATION  is stock market capitalization divided by GDP.  LAW
&  ORDER,  scored  I to 6,  is an  indicator of the degree to which citizens of a country are able to  utilize the existing  legal system  to
mediate  disputes  and  enforce  contrarts.  CREDITOR  RIGHTS  is  an  index  that  ranges  from  0  to 4 and  aggregates  creditor  rights.
Regressions also include EXFIN and interactions of financial and legal variables with  EXFIN. EXFIN  is the firm level excess  growth
a la Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1998)  The regression  is  estimated using firm  level pooled data using  firm and year random
effects  Standard  errors are  given  in parentheses.  In all specifications  coefficients  are multiplied  by 106.  Detailed  variable  definitions





ROA  0 0969
(0 5820)
Macro variables:
GDP (S)  -0.0005**
(O  0001)









BANK CREDIT  2.2900***
(0.4000)
BANK CREDIT x EXFIN  -0.0064
(0.0079)
MARKET  CAPITALIZATION  0.0890
(0 1460)





LAW &  ORDER  0.1940*8*
(0.0589)
LAW x EXFIN  0 0048*' 
(0.0020)
CRED. RIGHTS  -0.5530***
(0  1970)




No  of firms  2448
No. of Observations  12653
8,  **  and ***  indicate significance levels of 10,  5 and  I  percent respectively.
40Table VII
Sensitivity  Tests: Definition of Size
This  table  replicates  the  results  in  Table  Ill, defining  the  size  variable,  SIZE,  as total  assets  of the  firm  in  US $ The regression
equation estimated  is.  SIZE = V + 3,  NFATA +  32 NSNFA  +33 ROA +3 4GDP +  3,GDP/CAP + 36INFLATION + 37 OPENNESS +
3s EDUCATION  +39  BANK CREDIT  + 
3 ,o  MARKET CAPITALIZATION+  31  LAW  &  ORDER+,.  NFATA is the net fixed
assets  divided by total assets.  NSNFA  is the net sales divided by net fixed assets  ROA  is return on  assets  GDP is given in billions of
U S.  dollars.  GDP/CAP  is  real  GDP  per  capita  in  USS  INFLATION  is  the  log  difference  of the  Consumer  Price  Indicator.
OPENNESS  is  given  by  imports  plus  exports  divided  by  GDP  EDUCATION  is gross  enrolment  in  secondary  schools  BANK
CREDIT  is bank credit  extended  to the private sector divided by GDP.  MARKET CAPITALIZATION  is  stock market capitalization
divided  by  GDP. LAW & ORDER,  scored  I to 6,  is an indicator of the degree  to which  citizens  of a country are able  to utilize  the
existing  legal  system  to  mediate  disputes  and  enforce  contracts.  Specifications  (1-3)  enter  groups  of  variables  separately
Specification  (4) is the full model.  In Panel A,  all regressions are  estimated using firm  level pooled data over the  1988-1997  period
using  firm and  year  random effects.  In  Panel  B,  all  variables  are averaged  over  the  sample  period  and  regressions are  estimated
including industry dummy variables  Standard errors are given  in parentheses  In all specifications  coefficients  are multiplied by  106
Detailed variable definitions  and sources are given  in the appendix.
Panel A: Panel Results
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
NFATA  07941^"  09582***  0.7854***  0.8103"
(0.2453)  (0.2669)  (0  2579)  (0 2536)
NSNFA  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0 0002  -0.0001
(0 0002)  (0 0002)  (0.0002)  (0 0002)
ROA  -0.4743  -0.0718  -0.0565  -0.2343
(0 3328)  (0 0946)  (0 0920)  (0 3472)
Macro variables:
GDP (S)  0.0025"*  0 0025"*
(0.0001)  (0.0001)
GDP/CAP  0.0001***  0.0001***
(O 0000)  (O 0000)
INFLATION  0 0000  0 0000
(0.0001)  (0.0001)
OPENNESS  -0 0014  -0 0019
(0.0016)  (0.0018)
EDUCATION  -0 0017  -0 0023
(0.0019)  (0 0020)
Financial variables:
BANK CREDIT  22025***  1.0455***
(0.2239)  (0 2394)
MARKET  0 1386*  -0.1938**
CAPITALIZATION  (0  0855)  (0 0891)
Legal variable:
LAW &  ORDER  0.4492***  0.0769*
(O  0309)  (0.0345)
R 2  0.18  0 02  0.01  0.18
No. of firms  2746  2950  2943  2726
No  of Observations  15925  18581  18468  15252
'  and *** indicate significance  levels of 10,5 and  I percent respectively.
41Panel  B: Cross-Seetion  ResulJts
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
NFATA  -0.3126  -2.0452**  -1.3675  -0.3595
(0.9286)  (0.9641)  (0.9629)  (0.9329)
NSNFA  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0003  0.0001
(0 0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0 0004)
ROA  -1.3311  -3.0297  -2.4649  -1.4423
(1.7126)  (1.8139)  (1.8009)  (1.7181)
Macro variables:
GDP ($)  0.0024***  0.0024°°4
(0.0001)  (0.0002)
GDP/CAP  0.0001  0.0001
(0.0000)  (0.0001)
INFLATION  -0.0007  -0 0002
(0.0007)  (0.0008)
OPENNESS  -0.0023  -0.0049
(0.0024)  (0.0030)
EDUCATION  0.0050  0.0146
(0.0111)  (0.0118)
Financial variables:
BANK CREDIT  3.3396***  1.6996***
(0.5081)  (0.6009)
MARKET  -0.4675  0.2147
CAPITALIZATION  (0.3813)  (0.4714)
Legal variables:
LAW &  ORDER  1.1220**  -0.2535
(0.1306)  (0.2758)
R'  0.22  0.07  0.07  0 23
No  of  firmns  2863  2963  2963  2863
No  of Observations  2863  2963  2963  2863
and **c  indicate significance  levels of 10, 5 and I percent respectively.
42Appendix.  Table Al.
Number of Firm Level Observations in Each Country
The data source for firm level variables  is WorldScope.
Number of Firm Observations  Number of Firms
Argentina  170  17
Australia  760  76
Austria  570  57
Belgium  580  58
Brazil  990  99
Canada  1000  100
Chile  340  34
China  780  78
Colombia  150  15
Czech Republic  290  29
Denmark  910  91
Finland  630  63
France  1000  100
Germany  1000  100
Greece  640  64
Hong Kong  1000  100
Hungary  130  13
India  1000  100
Indonesia  790  79
Ireland  240  24
Israel  220  22
Italy  1000  100
Japan  1000  100
Korea  1000  100
Malaysia  1000  100
Mexico  520  52
Netherlands  1000  100
New Zealand  210  21
Norway  560  56
Pakistan  680  68
Peru  170  17
Philippines  360  36
Portugal  340  34
Singapore  830  83
South Africa  700  70
Spain  770  77
Sweden  1000  100
Switzerland  980  98
Taiwan  1000  100
Thailand  1000  100
Turkey  430  43
United Kingdom  1000  100
United States  1000  100
43Table A2
List of Industrees
Industiy  2-digit SIC
Food and Kindred Products  20
Tobacco Products  21
Textile Mill Products  22
Apparel and Other Textile Products  23
Lumber and Wood Products  24
Furniture and Fixtures  25
Paper and Allied Products  26
Printing and Publishing  27
Chemical and Allied Products  28
Petroleum and Coal Products  29
Rubber and Miscellaneous  Plastic Products  30
Leather and Leather Products  31
Stone, Clay and Glass Products  32
Primary Metal Industries  33
Fabricated Metal Products  34
Industrial Machinery  and Equipment  35
Electronic and Other Electric Equipment  36
Transportation Equipment  37
Instruments and Related  Products  38
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries  39
44Table A3
Variables and Sources
Variable  Definition  Source
ASSETS/GDP  Total assets of a firm divided by GDP, both in U.S. dollars  Worldscope
ASSETS($)  Total assets of a firm divided by  Worldscope
NFATA  Net fixed assets divided by total assets of a firm  Worldscope
NSNFA  Net sales divided by net fixed asssets of a firm  Worldscope
ROA  Profits divided by total assets of a firm  Worldscope
GDP  GDP in constant U.S. dollars  World Development
Indicators
GDP/CAP  Real per capita GDP  World Development
Indicators
OPENESS  Sum of real exports and imports as share of real GDP  World Development
Indicators
INFLATION  Log difference of Consumer Price Index  International Financial
Statistics (IFS), line 64
EDUCATION  Ratio of total enrollment,  regardless of age, to the population of the age  World Development
group that officially corresponds to secondary  education.  Indicators
45BANK CREDIT  {(O.5)*[F(t)/P_e(t)  + F(t-1)/P_e(t-1)]}/[GDP(t)/P  a(t)],  where F is credit  IFS
by deposit money banks to the private sector (lines 22d ), GDP is line 99b,
P_e is end-of period CPI (line 64) and P_a is the average CPI for the year.
MARKET  {(0.5)*[F(t)/P_e(t)  + F(t-1)/P_e(t-1)]}/[GDP(t)/P_a(t)],  where F is the  IFC Emerging Market
CAPITALIZATION  total value of outstanding shares,  GDP is line 99b, P_e is end-of period  Database and IFS
CPI (line 64) and P_a is the average CPI for the year.
LAW & ORDER  Measure of the law and order tradition of a country. It is an average over  LLSV (1998)
1982-1995.  It ranges from 6, strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law
and order tradition.
CREDITOR RIGHTS  An index aggregating  different creditor rights. The index is formed by  LLSV (1998)
adding  1  if:  (1) the country imposes restrictions, such as creditors'  consent,
to file for reorganization;  (2)  secured creditors are able to gain possession
of their security once the reorganization petition has been approved (no
automatic stay);  (3)  secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of
the proceeds that result from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt firm;
and (4) the debtor does not retain the administration of its property pending
the resolution of the reorganization.  The index ranges from 0 to 4.
CONCENTRATION  Share of the assets of 3 largest banks in total banking assets  Bankscope
PUBLIC BANKS  Share of assets in largest  10 banks owned by the government as share of  La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
total assets of these banks  and Shleifer (2001).
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